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PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN AN AGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
CHARLES PIERSON*
Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking
gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
President George W. Bush'
I. THE FIGHT OVER PREEMPTION
With the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine, President George W. Bush
announced a U.S. policy of preemptive action against terrorist states. 2 President
Bush had previously identified Iraq, together with Iran and North Korea, as part of
an "axis of evil" bent on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
3
The Bush Administration asserted that the danger of WMD in the hands of Saddam
Hussein was so great that it justified a preemptive attack on Iraq before these
weapons could be developed and used.4
' J.D., Duquesne University School of Law, 1998. The author extends warm thanks to the following
who read and offered invaluable comments on drafts of this article: Samuel J. Astorino, Ph.D., J.D.,
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; Michla Pomerance, Emilio Von Hofmannstahl
Professor of International Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author assumes sole
responsibility for the contents. This article is dedicated to the memory of my father, Charles Edward
Pierson, Sr. (1917-1994).
1. See Transcript: Confronting Iraq 'Is Crucial to Winning War on Terror, 'N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2002, at A12 (transcript of President Bush's October 7, 2002 speech in Cincinnati, Ohio) [hereinafter
Cincinnati Speech].
2. In a commencement address at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on June 1, 2002,
President Bush declared: "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the
worst threats before they emerge." See Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy
in West Point, New York, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 944 (June 10, 2002), also available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002106/20020601-3.html (June 1, 2002) (transcript)
(visited Oct. 4, 2004); David E. Sanger, Bush to Outline Doctrine of Striking Foes First, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2002, at Al. The Bush Doctrine, of which pre-emptive strikes are only one part, has received
its fullest exposition in the National Security Strategy released on September 17, 2002. See National
Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 17, 2002) [hereinafter National Security
Strategy], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (visited Oct. 4, 2004).
3. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 133 (Feb. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html (visited Oct. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter "President's 2002 State of the Union Address"].
4. See David E. Sanger, Bush Sees 'Urgent Duty' to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2002, at Al; Judy Keen, Bush: U.S. Can't Await 'Final Proof' USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2002, at IA;
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The Administration made the case against Iraq in speeches by Vice President
Dick Cheney on August 26, 2002,' by Secretary of State Colin Powell before the
U.N. Security Council on February 5, 20036, and in addresses by President Bush
before the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 12, 20027 and on
U.S. television on October 7, 2002.8 Detailed charges against Iraq also are set out
in the joint resolution for the use of military force drafted by the Administration
and adopted by Congress. 9 Preemption supplants the containment strategy the
United States had pursued against Iraq in the decade following the 1991 Persian
Gulf War.' 0
"Preemption," "preemptive self-defense," and "anticipatory self-defense"
traditionally refer to a state's right to strike first in self-defense when faced with
Elisabeth Bumiller and James Dao, Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2002, at Al; Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. Must Act First to Battle Terror, Bush Tells Cadets, N.Y.
TIMES (INTERNATIONAL), June 2, 2002, § 1, at 1.
Contrary to popular misconception, Bush policy is not a radical break with the past. Regime change in
Iraq has been the policy of the United States since the closing days of the Clinton Administration. See
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C.S. §2151(3) (1998); The President's Radio Address, William J.
Clinton, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 2514, (Dec. 28, 1998); BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATrACK 10
(2004); KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ 91, 94
(2002); DILIP HIRO, IRAQ: IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 145 (2002).
5. In Cheney's Words: The Administration Case for Removing Saddam Hussein, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2002, at A8 (excerpts from Vice President Cheney's August 26, 2002 speech before the
Nashville convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars) [hereinafter Nashville Speech].
6. The Case Against Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A38.
7. In Bush's Words: On Iraq, U.N. Must Face Up to Its Founding Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2002, at AI0 (transcript of President Bush's September 12, 2002 address before the United Nations
General Assembly) [hereinafter UN Speech].
8. Cincinnati Speech, supra note I, at A]2.
9. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 114,
107th Cong. (2002), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1498 [hereinafter Iraq Resolution]. The resolution describes
Iraq's breach of Security Council resolutions, including resolutions relating to disarmament and human
rights violations against the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Kurds; the 1993 assassination plot against former
President Bush; Iraq's possession, development, and attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction;
Iraq's support for and harboring of terrorist groups, including AI-Qaeda; and the danger that Iraq would
transfer weapons of mass destruction to such terrorist groups. Id. The last items link war on Iraq to the
war on terror and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.
Charges against Iraq also appear in Security Council Resolution 1441. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N.
SCOR, 4644
th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002). All of the Security Council resolutions cited in
this article are available on the web site of the United Nations at http://www.un.org/documents/scres.
10. Containment of Saddam rested on the five pillars of U.N. weapons inspections; U.S./U.N.
sanctions on Iraq in the form of import/export controls; the imposition of "no-fly" zones over the north
and south of Iraq; continuing sporadic limited military action, chiefly in the form of punitive air strikes;
and a continued U.S. troop presence in the Persian Gulf region. See POLLACK, supra note 4, at x, xv-
xxii. Vice President Dick Cheney argued that Saddam is no longer "containable" in a speech before the
Veterans of Foreign Wars in Nashville on August 26, 2002. See Nashville Speech, supra note 5, at A8.
Mr. Cheney said: "[C]ontainment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction and
are prepared to share them with terrorists, who intend to inflict catastrophic causalities on the United
States." Id. According to Mr. Cheney, U.N. weapons inspections were insufficient to prevent
Saddam's obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Id. Accord Robert J. Lieber, The Folly of
Containment, COMMENT., Apr. 1, 2003, at 15.
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imminent attack-to beat an adversary to the punch." Preemption remains
relevant in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Bush Administration
contemplates preemptive military action to disarm Iran, Syria, North Korea, and
Cuba. This article examines whether anticipatory self defense is permitted under
international law and, if so, whether the invasion of Iraq was a legitimate exercise
of anticipatory self-defense.
II. DID IRAQ'S MATERIAL BREACH OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR CEASE-FIRE
PROVIDE AUTHORIZATION FOR WAR?
Before discussing the legality of anticipatory self-defense, this section looks
briefly at the Administration's argument that Operation Iraqi Freedom was legal
due to Iraq's material breach of the 1991 Persian Gulf War cease-fire agreement.12
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 triggered the right of individual and
II. The three terms are used synonymously in this article. They are distinguished from preventive
war which all commentators agree is condemned under international law. See Louis RenE Beres, After
the Gulf War: Israel, Pre-emption, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 259, 264 n. II
(1991); Louis Ren6 Beres, Striking "First": Israel's Post-Gulf War Options under International Law,
14 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1, 1 n.2 (1991). The difference between preemption and preventive war is:
Preemption is a military strategy of striking an enemy first, with the expectation that the
only alternative is to be struck first oneself. A preemptive attack differs from a preventive
attack, which is launched out of concern for long-term deterioration in the pertinent
military balance, rather than fear of imminent hostilities. Thus, in a preemptive attack, the
enemy's action is anticipated in a very short time, while in a preventive attack, the interval
is considerably longer.
Beres, Striking "First, " supra, at 1 n.2.
The Department of Defense defines a "preemptive attack" as "[a]n attack initiated on the basis of
incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent." U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE,
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 415 (12 Apr. 2001, As Amended
Through 17 Dec. 2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jpl_.02.pdf (visited
Mar. 12, 2004). A "preventive war" is "[a] war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not
imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk." Id. at 419.
12. The material breach argument was included in President Bush's address to the nation
delivered two days before the beginning of the war. See Bush's Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and
His Sons Must Leave, 'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A14 (transcript of President Bush's March 17,
2003 address) [hereinafter Bush's Speech on Iraq]; Peter Slevin, Legality of War Is a Matter of Debate:
Many Scholars Doubt Assertion by Bush, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2003, at A16. The implied
authorization argument had previously been set forth by William H. Taft IV, the Legal Adviser of the
U.S. Department of State. See U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Taft: Bush Has Legal Authority to Use Force in
Iraq, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/rights/law/03032201 .htm (Mar. 21, 2003) (excerpt of
remarks before the National Association of Attorneys General, March 20, 2003) (visited Oct. 19, 2003);
William H. Taft IV & Todd Buchwald, Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict: Preemption.
Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003); Peter Slevin, U.S. Says War Has Legal
Basis: Reliance on Gulf War Resolutions Is Questioned by Others, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2003, at A] 4.
The material breach argument was subsequently presented to the United Nations Security Council. See
Letter Dated 20 March from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 21,
2003), available at http://www.un.int/usa/s2003-35l.pdf (visited July 13, 2003). The United States'
legal position was joined by the United Kingdom. See Attomey-General's Written Answer on 17
March 2003 Setting out His View of the Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/AG%20Written%20Answer/20of/2017%2OMarch% 202003.pdf
(Mar. 18, 2003) (visited May 14, 2003).
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collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 3 Shortly
thereafter, in Resolution 678, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter and authorized Member States to "use all necessary means to uphold
and implement Res. 660" and "all subsequent relevant resolutions."14  One of
those "subsequent relevant resolutions" was Resolution 687, the Gulf War cease-
fire, which required Iraq to disarm and submit to weapons inspections.15 Iraq's
material breach of the ceasefire revived Resolution 678's authorization to use
force. 16 This conclusion proceeds from a number of rationales. One is to treat
Security Council Resolution 687 as analogous to a treaty. 17 Under the law of
treaties, material breach of a treaty allows a "specially affected" party to suspend
operation of the treaty. 18 Another rationale is that the cease-fire was expressly
13. See Andru E. Wall, The Legal Case for Invading Iraq and Toppling Hussein, 32 ISRAEL Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 165, 165, 172 (2002).
14. S.C. Res. 678, Para. 2, U.N. SCOR, 2963rd Sess. (1990), (emphasis added). "All necessary
means" is standard Security Council shorthand for military force. See MOHAMED AWAD OSMAN, THE
UNITED STATES AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT: WARS, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 52-54 (2002).
While commentators routinely refer to Security Council Resolution 678 as the "authorization" for the
Persian Gulf War the Council's consent was not needed. As already stated, Desert Storm was a legal
exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense set out in U.N. Charter Article 51. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text; U.N. CHARTER art. 51; Taft & Buchwald, supra note 12, at 558
n.4 and'accompanying text; Wall, supra note 13, at 172, 175, 177-78. The United States went to the
Security Council in 1991, as it did in 2003, for political reasons: to help build a coalition to act against
Iraq. See Wall, supra, at 172, 177-78.
15. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2983rd Sess. (1991)). See John Yoo, International Law and the
War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2003); Michael J. Matheson, REMARKS, in Legal Authority for the
Possible Use of Force against Iraq, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 136, 138 (1998); Frederic L. Kirgis,
Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament
Obligations, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.INSIGHTS (Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh92.htm (visited Oct. 7, 2004). Unlike a peace treaty, a cease-fire
agreement only temporarily suspends, rather than terminates, hostilities. See Wall, supra note 13, at
180, 183. The state of war continues. Id. at 180, 182. For background on the Gulf War cease-fire, see
id. at 178-183.
16. See Taft & Buchwald, supra note 12, at 557, 558; Yoo, supra note 15,at 567; Kirgis, supra
note 15; Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force
against Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.. 724, 725-26 (1998). In his address on
the eve of war President Bush said: "Under [Security Council] Resolutions 678 and 687, both still in
effect, the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass
destruction." See Bush 's Speech on Iraq, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
17. See Kirgis, supra note 15. Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell objects that Security Council
resolutions are not analogous to treaties because Council resolutions are binding even without the
consent of states subject to them. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, UN Resolution 1441: Compelling
Saddam, Restraining Bush, JURIST, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forunmi/forumnew73.php
(visited Nov. 27, 2002) (text accompanying note 11) While this is true of most Security Council
resolutions it is not true of S.C. Res. 687 which provided that it would come into effect only upon its
acceptance by Iraq. See S.C. Res. 687 Op. Para. 33. The requirement of Iraqi consent makes S.C. Res.
687 resemble a treaty more than a typical Security Council resolution. See Robert F. Turner, Was
Operation Iraqi Freedom Legal?, in LAURIE MYLROIE, BUSH VS. THE BELTWAY: HOW THE CIA AND
THE STATE DEPARTMENT TRIED To STOP THE WAR ON TERROR 164, 177-78 (2003). This is not
surprising given the resolution's origin as a cease-fire agreement negotiated in the field between the
Iraqi and Coalition military commanders. See Wall, supra note 13, at 178-79. Iraq notified the Security
Council of its acceptance on April 6, 1991. Wall, supra note 13,at 180.
18. See Kirgis, supra note 15; Yoo, supra note 15, at 568; Vienna Convention on the Law of
2004
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conditioned on Iraq's disarmament and compliance with inspections. 19 The
Security Council found Iraq in material breach of the cease-fire on numerous
occasions.
20
The first President Bush relied upon the material breach argument to establish
"no-fly" zones over northern and southern Iraq.2' When the United States, Britain,
and France bombed Iraq in January 1993 in order to enforce Iraqi compliance with
weapons inspections they did not seek specific authorization from the Security
Council. 22 Nevertheless, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared
that the strikes were pursuant to Resolution 678.23 President Clinton used the
material breach argument to justify the December 1998 Operation Desert Fox
bombing campaign against Iraq.24
Security Council Resolution 1441 reinforces the conclusion that the United
States had authorization for the war on Iraq. Security Council Resolution 1441,
passed unanimously on November 8, 2002, gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to
disarm. To that end Resolution 1441 provided for a resumption of weapon
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969), art. 60(2)(b) (concluded at Vienna, May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. The Vienna Convention postdates the Charter and is nonretroactive
in application. Vienna Convention art. 4. It is cited solely as evidence of the customary law of treaty
interpretation. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. The United States is a "specially affected"
state because it is the world's leading target of terrorism and presumably of any Iraqi WMD. See Kirgis
supra note 15.
19. See Wedgwood, supra note 16, at 725-26.
20. Iraq was first found in material breach less than six months after the Gulf War ended. See
S.C. Res. 707 Op. Para. 1 (Aug. 15, 1991); Wall, supra note 13, at 166 n.5. The Security Council
would find Iraq in material breach repeatedly thereafter. See S.C. Res. 1060 Op. Para. 1 (June 12,
1996) ("clear violation"); S.C. Res. 1115 Op. Para. 1 (June 21, 1997) ("clear and flagrant violation");
S.C. Res. 1134 Op. Para. 2 (Oct. 23, 1997) ("flagrant violation"); S.C. Res. 1137 Op. Para. 1 (Nov. 12,
1997) ("continued violations"); S.C. Res. 1194 Op. Para. 1 (Sept. 9, 1998) ("totally unacceptable
contravention of its obligations"); S.C. Res. 1205 Op. Para. 1 (Nov. 5, 1998) ("flagrant violation"); S.C.
Res. 1441 Op. Para. 1 (Nov. 8, 2002). On six occasions between 1991 and 1992 the President of the
Security Council declared that Iraq was in material breach of Resolution 687. See Yoo, supra note 15,
at 569, 569 n.35 (2003). For brief histories of Iraq's breaches of the ceasefire, see Turner, supra note
17, at 173-77; Paul Schott Stevens, Andru E. Wall, and At Dinlene, The Just Demands of Peace and
Security: International Law and the Case against Iraq, available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/War 0/20on%20Terror/iraqfinal-web.pdf, at 8-12 (visited Feb. 17, 2004).
21. See O'Connell, supra note 17. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687 were read together
with Security Council Resolution 888, which condemned Iraq's repression of the Iraqi Kurds and
Shiites. Id. Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell reluctantly concedes that owing to Security Council
acquiescence the no-fly zones were "arguably permissible." Id.
22. See Wedgwood, supra note 16.
23. See Taft & Buchwald, supra note 12, at 559; Yoo, supra note 15, at 570; George Bush, Letter
to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, Jan. 19, 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 67, 67 (Jan. 25, 1993) (quoting UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali).
24. See William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Military Strikes Against Iraq,
Dec. 18, 1998, in PUB. PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON 2195, 2195-96 (1998); Matheson, supra note
15 at 137-38, 141-42. Mr. Matheson was Principal Deputy Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of
State during Operation Desert Fox.
25. S.C. Res. 1441 Op. Para. 2 (Nov. 8, 2002). The same language appeared in Security Council
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inspections in Iraq interrupted since UNMOVIC inspectors left Iraq in 1998.26 The
resolution warned that Iraq's failure to submit to renewed inspections would lead
to "serious consequences," understood to mean war." Following adoption of
Resolution 1441 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte
indicated that the United States did not consider Resolution 1441 to be a bar to
unilateral U.S. action should the Security Council fail to act.
28
III. SELF DEFENSE PRIOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The right of self-defense is set out in customary international law in the so-
called Caroline doctrine. In 1837 a portion of Canada was in rebellion against the
British Crown. The vessel Caroline was owned by a group of Americans who in
1837 were using her to ferry men and supplies to rebels on an island on the
Canadian side of the Niagara River.29 To cut off assistance to the rebels, British
troops crossed into U.S. territory on December 29, 1837, loosed the Caroline from
her moorings on the New York side of the river, set fire to the ship, and sent her
over the Falls. 30 The resulting legal issue was whether the British had acted
legitimately in self-defense. In an exchange of diplomatic correspondence with
Lord Ashburton of Great Britain, Secretary of State Daniel Webster set forth the
conditions of necessity and proportionality which came to be accepted as the
customary law requirements for the exercise of self defense (the "Caroline
Resolution 678 which authorized the 1991 Persian Gulf War. S.C. Res. 678 Op. Para. I ("one final
opportunity"); Taft & Buchwald, supra note 12, at 558, 560.
26. S.C. Res. 1441. UNMOVIC stands for United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission established in 1999. S.C. Res. 1284 Op. Para. 1 (Dec. 17, 1999). UNMOVIC
is the successor to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). S.C. Res. 687 Op.
Para. 9(b)(i) (Apr. 3, 1991).
27. S.C. Res. 1441 Op Para. 13. See Julia Preston, Security Council Votes, 15-0, For Tough Iraq
Resolution; Bush Calls It a 'Final Test, 'N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at Al; Kirgis, supra note 15.
28. Ambassador Negroponte stated that "[O]ne way or another... Iraq will be disarmed." The
Rationale for the U.N. Resolution on Iraq, in the Diplomats' Own Words, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at
A8. Unidentified government sources asserted that in the event Iraq materially breached Resolution
1441 and the Security Council took no action the United States would be legally justified in proceeding
to invade Iraq. See Preston, supra note 27, at A8 ("United States officials said that [Resolution 1441]
gives Washington the legal basis to go to war unilaterally if the Council cannot agree how to respond to
new violations by Baghdad."). Also significant is President Bush's statement after adoption of
Resolution 1441 that: "The United States has agreed to discuss any material breach with the Security
Council, but without jeopardizing our freedom of action to defend our country, If Iraq fails to fully
comply, the United States and other nations will disarm Saddam Hussein." Transcript of Bush 's
Remarks on the Security Council's Iraq Resolution, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2002, at A10 (emphasis
added). Compare similar remarks made by President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis:
"This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for
a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum-in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other
meeting that could be useful-without limiting our freedom of action." President John F. Kennedy,
Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba (Oct. 22,
1962), in PUB. PAPERS OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 806, 808 (1962); 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715, 718 (1962)
[hereinafter Radio and Television Report] (emphasis added).
29. See Michael Byers, Jumping the Gun, LONDON REv. BKS 3 (July 25, 2002).
30. Id.; see also Frederic L. Kirgis, Cruise Missile Strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan, ASIL
INSIGHT, Aug. 1998, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh24.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
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doctrine").3 1 Necessity requires imminent "overwhelming" danger and exhaustion,
unavailability, or futility of peaceful means to avert attack. The force employed
must be proportional to the danger sought to be averted.32 The British accepted
Webster's criteria and agreed that the British attack had failed to meet them.
Under Caroline, an actual armed attack was not required as the precondition for
the use of force in self-defense.33 Thus, the Caroline criteria permit both reactive
and anticipatory self-defense so long as necessity and proportionality are
observed.34
IV. DID ARTICLE 5 I's DRAFTERS INTEND TO ELIMINATE THE CUSTOMARY RIGHT
OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE? LESSONS OF THE TRA VAUXPRPPARATOIRES
Article 51, the United Nations Charter's provision on self-defense, does not
include the phrase "anticipatory self-defense." Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
35
The question of whether the customary law doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense survives under the United Nations Charter is addressed by two schools.36
"Restrictionists" argue that Article 51 eliminates the customary right of
31. See MOORE, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906). Secretary Webster wrote that a
nation may employ force in self defense when there exists "[a] necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." See THE PAPERS OF
DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 669 (K. Shewmaker, ed. 1983).
32. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, ASIL TASK FORCE ON
TERRORISM, at 25-36, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (last visited
Sept. 24, 2004); See I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (R.Y. Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, eds.,
9th ed. 1990). According to Webster, proportionality requires "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since
the act justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it." Id.
33. See Yoram Dinstein, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 172 (1988); Louis Ren6 Beres,
After the Scud Attacks: Israel, "Palestine, " and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71,
75- 76 (1992): Beres, After the GulfWar, supra note 11, at 266; Beres, Striking First, supra note 11, at
6; Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598
(1963).
34. Webster's criteria trace to Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf. See Beres, Striking First, supra
note 11, at 6, citing HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. 11, ch. 1 (1625); EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 11, ch. IV (1758); Louis Ren6 Beres, Preserving the Third Temple:
Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense under International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. I 11,
125 (1993), citing SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW 32 (Frank Gardner Moore trans., 1927) (1682).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
36. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 73 (1993).
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anticipatory self defense set out in the Caroline doctrine and limits self-defense to
the case of an actual armed attack. Restrictionists maintain that the intent of
Article 51 's drafters was to raise the standard of necessity required up until 1945." 7
Henceforth, the necessity to use force in self-defense would exist only "if an armed
attack occurs." "Counter-restrictionists" believe that the customary right of
anticipatory self-defense survives under the Charter.38 The customary right
allowed force to be used in advance of an armed attack so long as an attack was
imminent.3 9 The United States follows the counter-restrictionist position.4 °
Each school focuses on a different phrase in Article 51. Restrictionists
emphasize the phrase "if an armed attack occurs." Counter-restrictionists focus on
Article 51's opening sentence: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self defense .... 4' Counter-
restrictionists take "inherent right" to refer to the right of self-defense as it existed
under customary law, including the right of anticipatory self-defense. 42 Counter-
restrictionists insist that the language "if an armed attack occurs" must not be
misread as "if and only if.''43 The phrase merely emphasizes what, in 1945, was
considered to be the paramount, but not the sole, form of aggression without
limiting self-defense to an "armed attack." 44  Significantly, the French text of
37. See cf MYREs S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 233, 235 (1961) (rejecting this position). Some restrictionists maintain that by 1945
customary international law already included a requirement that self-defense could be exercised only in
the event of an armed attack. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 150 (1991); Oscar Schachter, The Scope of Legitimate Self-Defense, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: MILITARY AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 21, 22 (Paul B. Stephan III &
Boris M. Klimenko, eds., 1991); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 274 (1963) (restrictions imposed by Article 51 may, by 1945, have become part of customary
international law). Under this view Article 51 was intended to be merely declarative of then-existing
customary law prohibiting anticipatory self-defense. This view cannot be accepted. As Professor
Schachter remarks, if customary law by 1945 did require an armed attack as the precondition for self-
defense then the words "armed attack" in Article 51 would be redundant. See Schachter, supra, at 2 1.
38. The two schools are also called the "restrictivists" and "expansivists," respectively. Richard
G. Maxon, Nature's Eldest Law: A Survey of a Nation 's Right to Act in Self-Defense, 25 PARAMETERS
55 (1995).
39. See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, 26
WASH. Q. 89, 91 (2003); McDougal, supra note 33, at 598.
40. See George K. Walker, Anticipatory Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have
Said, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 322 (1998).
41. UN CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added); O'Connell, supra note 32, at 12.
42. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 86 (2000); Eugene v.
Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 510
(1991) (Inasmuch as self-defense is an incident of sovereignty it cannot be limited or taken away-even
by treaty) [hereinafter Rostow]; Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and
Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 539, 558 (2002)
(This view was shared by U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg during the negotiations over the
Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war).
43. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37, at 237; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ 14 at 347-48 (June 27) (Jennings, dissenting); S.M.
Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International Law, 136 RECUIL DES
COURS 411, 480 (1972, Vol. 2).
44. See AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 73; Yoram Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para- War"
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Article 51 refers not to the narrow concept of attaque armke ("armed attack") but
to the broad concept of aggression arm~e ("armed aggression"). 5 Inasmuch as
international law scholars have not been able to agree on a definition of aggression
in fifty years, it would be odd if Article 51 identified aggression with only one
narrow contingency, an "armed attack," and restricted self-defense to that
circumstance alone.46 The International Court of Justice has not spoken to the
legality of anticipatory self-defense. In the Nicaragua case the Court reserved
judgment on whether an imminent threat of armed attack would pass Article 51
muster.47
Since the text, by itself, will not reveal whether the Charter permits
anticipatory self-defense, reference must be had to Article 51's drafting history.48
Counter-restrictionists contend that the Article 51 travaux pr~paratoires do not
support a conclusion that anticipatory self-defense is illegal under the Charter.49
Professor Timothy L. H. McCormack demonstrates that restrictionists offer only
perfunctory analyses of the Article 51 travaux pr~paratoires.50 Taking one
example, Professor McCormack comments that Professor Louis Henkin provides
no review of the travaux prparatoires to support his bald assertion that "Nothing
in the history of its [Article 51's] drafting (the travaux prbparatoires) suggests that
the framers of the Charter intended something broader than the language
implied.""1
Counter-restrictionists assert that the purpose of Article 51 was not to
eliminate anticipatory self-defense but to make plain-particularly to the Latin
American delegations attending the San Francisco conference-that the Charter
permits regional security organizations to act in self-defense without prior
authorization from the U.N. Security Council ("individual or collective self-
and Peace in the Middle East, in 2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: READINGS 158, 160 (John Norton
Moore, ed. 1977) (rejecting this view); Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUIL DES CouRS 451, 497 (1952, Vol. 2).
45. Timothy L. H. McCormack, Anticipatory Self-Defense in the Legislative History of the United
Nations Charter, 25 ISRAEL L. REV. 1, 36 (1991); Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 43, at 543 (Jennings,
dissenting).
46, For a contrasting view that the Article 51 drafters did intend a narrow concept of "armed
attack" see infra notes 59 - 62 and accompanying text.
47. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 43, at 103.
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §325(1) (1987). Terms of
international agreements are to be interpreted according to their "ordinary meaning." Where a treaty's
meaning can not be determined from its words alone recourse may be had to the treaty's travaux
pr~paratoires: the treaty's drafting history. Id. at §325 comment e; Vienna Convention, supra note 18,
art. 32(a). The Vienna Convention is cited solely as evidence of the customary law of treaty
interpretation. See McCormack, supra note 45, at 4-7.
49. See McCormack, supra note 45, passim; MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37, at 235-36.
50. See McCormack, supra note 45, at 3.
51. Id., quoting Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141 (2d ed. 1979) (brackets in original).
Professor McCormack might also have quoted Professor Brownlie's similarly perfunctory assertion that
the drafting history of Article 51 reflects "a presumption against self-help and even action in self-
defense within Article 51 was made subject to control by the Security Council." See IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275 (1963).
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defense"). 2 The wording of Article 51 follows closely the wording of Part I of the
Act of Chapultepec which required an armed attack in order for signatories to
respond in self-defense.53 Professor McCormack suggests that the Article 51
drafters imported the words "armed attack" unreflectingly from the Act of
Chapultepecf 4 Had Article 51 's purpose been to change existing customary law,
this would have been a change so momentous that it would have been extensively
debated in the drafting sessions.55 But the travaux pr4paratoires show that this
issue was not discussed.
56
V. DOES ARTICLE 51 REQUIRE A STATE TO "ABSORB" THE FIRST BLOW?
We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents
a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.
Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic weapons are so swift, that any
substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their
deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.
57
President John F. Kennedy
Section IV argued that the drafters of Article 51 did not intend to cut down
the customary right of self-defense by limiting its exercise to the occurrence of an
"armed attack." Other writers maintain that the drafters intended just that;
Professor Michael J. Glennon observes that in 1945, so great was the fear that
states would use self-defense as a pretext for aggression that the Article 51 drafters
decided to impose a "bright line" test: self-defense would be allowed only in the
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added); see SCHACHTER, supra note 37, at 150; LELAND M.
GOODRICH, EDVARD HAMBRO, & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 342-44 (3d rev. ed. 1969); McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37,
at 235; McCormack, supra note 47, at 8, 25-27; Schwebel, supra note 43, at 480; Waldock, supra note
44, at 497.
The Latin American nations feared Communist penetration. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF
CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 66, 175, 180 (2003). Would the Security Council
protect them or would the Council be blocked by a Soviet veto? Id. at 175. As insurance against
possible Security Council ineffectiveness the Latin American states insisted that regional defense
organizations be included in the Charter. The episode is significant for showing that even from the
beginning doubts existed as to whether the Security Council would be able to perform its assigned
function of protecting international peace and security. See infra, § VII.
53. See McCormack, supra note 45, at 33; Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance And Solidarity
(Act of Chapultepec), reprinted in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, VOL. III: MULTILATERAL 1931-1945
1024 (1968). The Act of Chapultepec was a mutual defense pact concluded among Latin American
states and the United States towards the end of World War Two. The Act of Chapultepec was the
forerunner of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 ("Rio Treaty") which
established the Organization of American States.
54. McCormack, supra note 45, at 35, 36.
55. Id. at 7-8.
56. Id. at 8, 35.
57. See Radio and Television Report, supra note 28, at 807.
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event of an "armed attack."58
Neither Article 51 nor the rest of the U.N. Charter defines "armed attack." 59
In the view under examination the drafters of Article 51 intended a narrow
conception of "armed attack" which included only trans-border attacks by army,
navy, or air forces.6 ° Prime examples would be the Nazi invasion of Poland in
1939 or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This mode of aggression was vivid in
the experience of the Charter drafters. Confronted with the threat of invasion,
Article 51 would allow a target state to mass its forces at the border prepared to
meet the invaders. But not until the invaders crossed the frontier would an armed
attack have occurred and the target state be allowed to respond with force.
6 1
In contrast, counter-restrictionists refuse to impose a purely technical
requirement that an enemy army first set foot across the border.62  Counter-
58. Professor Glennon writes:
The new requirement narrowed significantly the circumstances in which force could be
used. And it set out a readily identifiable and, it was thought, objectively verifiable event
to trigger defensive rights. Phony defensive justifications would be less plausible and war
be less frequent, thereby vindicating the first great purpose of the Charter-"to maintain
international peace and security."
Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, WKLY. STANDARD
24 (Jan. 28, 2002). The final phrase quotes the Charter. U.N. CHARTER Preamble and art. 1(1). As
Professor Glennon's title indicates, he believes the Charter design is no longer adequate. See also
Glennon, supra note 42, at 546. Accord HENKIN, supra note 51, at 142 (The "armed attack"
requirement was imposed because an "actual armed attack" is "clear, unambiguous, subject to proof,
and not easily open to misinterpretation or fabrication."); J. E. S. Fawcett, Intervention in International
Law: A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS 347, 361 (1961-I1).
59. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 668, 669 (Bruno Simma ed.,
Oxford University Press 1994); Andru E. Wall, Lawfully Defending the Peace: The Bush Doctrine and
the Global War on Terrorism, 4:2 ENGAGE 95, 97, 98 (2003), available at www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/Engage/oct%2003.pdf (visited Apr. 27, 2004); Krzysztof Skubiszewski, The
Postwar Alliances of Poland and the United Nations Charter, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 620 (1959). State
practice since 1945 has defined "armed attack" broadly. See Wall supra, at 96. Thus, the
Administration of the first President Bush argued that attacks on American military and civilian
personnel in and around the Panama Canal Zone constituted an "armed attack" allowing U.S.
intervention. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Use ofArmed Force in International Affairs: Self-Defense and
the Panama Invasion, 29 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT'L L. 609, 609, 619-21 (1991). The Clinton
Administration justified its 1993 air strikes on Baghdad with the claim that a failed Iraqi assassination
attempt against former President Bush constituted an "armed attack" on the United States. See John
Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq's Intelligence
Headquarters, 17 HASTINGS INT'L L. & COMP. L. REV. 241, 252, 271 (1994). These are examples of
reactive, rather than anticipatory, self-defense; in both cases the United States' position was that an
"armed attack" had already occurred. Id. at 252, 258, 260; Wedgwood, supra, at 609, 619-21.
60. Cf National Security Strategy, supra note 2, at 13; AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 97.
61. Harold Stassen, one of the U.S. negotiators on the Charter, and later a perennial Presidential
candidate, gave the example of an enemy fleet approaching the United States. The United States may
send an opposing fleet to meet the enemy fleet. But until the enemy fleet has entered U.S. territorial
waters the U.S. may not respond with force. See Thomas M. Franck, When, ffEver, May States Deploy
Military Force without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 51, 58-59
(2001). Counter-restrictionists reject this approach as unworkable in an age of weapons of mass
destruction. By contrast, Professor Dinstein has argued that the U.S. could legally have interdicted the
Japanese fleet as it was on its way to Pearl Harbor. See infra, text accompanying note 72.
62. See JULIUS STONE, THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER CEASE-FIRE 4 (1967), cited in Amos Shapira,
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restrictionists insist that the critical factor is an enemy's intent to imminently
attack: the Charter drafters imposed the "armed attack" requirement only as the
best index then available for determining imminent hostile intent.
63
Still, when the discussion is limited to a conventional attack there is
something to be said for the "armed attack" criterion. Faced with a conventional
attack waiting may be advisable: postponing the use of force gives diplomacy a
chance to defuse tensions and possibly avert conflict.64 There is less chance that
force will be used by mistake. But in the case of a non-conventional attack, a
literal adherence to Article 51 may spell national suicide. Whatever the intent of
Article 5 1's drafters, in an age of weapons of mass destruction, a state which waits
for an "armed attack" before defending itself may be ensuring its own
annihilation. 65 In the case of nuclear missiles or other WMD it is absurd-indeed,
lethal-to require a state to first absorb an attack before responding.66  WMD
radically foreshorten response time and can occasion massive destruction in a
single stroke. In order to avoid this outcome states need the right to pre-empt the
aggressor-to defend themselves before the first blow is struck.67 A state which
does not anticipate the first blow is, in Professor Myres McDougal's memorable
The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, VOLUME II:
READINGS 205, 215 n.24 (John Norton Moore, ed. 1975); Waldock, supra note 44, at 498 ("Where there
is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually
mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it was not passed the
frontier."). Thus, counter-restrictionists conclude, Israel acted legally by striking preemptively against
Egyptian and Syrian armies gathering on its frontier in June 1967. See infra § VI.
63. See Glennon, supra note 58, at 26. Whether "armed attack" is still the best gauge of hostile
intent is open to question. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
64. Recall that as part of necessity Caroline required that alternatives to force would have to be
either unavailable or exhausted ("no choice of means"). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
65. Under the principle of rebus sic stantibus, materially changed circumstances allow operation
of a treaty such as the United Nations Charter to be suspended in whole or in part. The materially
changed circumstances must have been unforeseen at the time the treaty was entered into; must strike at
the basis upon which the parties gave consent; and must fundamentally alter the parties' future
obligations under the treaty. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism, ASIL
INSIGHTS (June 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insights (visited July 28, 2002); Vienna
Convention, supra note 18, Art. 62; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 48, §336. The advent of WMD
constitutes materially changed circumstances suspending Article 51 's "armed attack" requirement.
66. See Schwebel, supra note 43, at 481. As Israel argued before the Security Council after its
attack on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor: "[T]he concept of [self-defense] took on new and far wider
application with the advent of the nuclear era." See U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2288 (June 19, 1981) (Israel).
67. See Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89,
93 (1991). Professor Beres argues that the "customary right of anticipatory self defense articulated by
the Caroline" survives into the Charter system in order to avoid the absurd result of requiring a state to
absorb the first blow. Id. Beres forcefully concludes: "International law is not a suicide pact." Id. at
90. President Bush has echoed Professor Beres' words. President Bush has said of terrorists and
terrorist states such as Iraq: "[R]esponding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-
defense, it is suicide." See Bush's Speech on Iraq, supra note 12, at AI0, col. 4. The International
Court of Justice has left open the question whether a state may launch a preemptive nuclear attack if its
very existence were at risk. See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8, 1996).
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phrase, a "sitting duck.",68 Former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' judgment
that the Charter was a "pre-atomic age" document reflects how Article 5 1's "armed
attack" requirement fails to cope with the new technology of mass destruction.
69
Some restrictionists attempt to sidestep the need for anticipatory force by
declaring that an attack occurs at the moment it is launched.7 ° Professor Dinstein
takes the view that had the United States attacked the Japanese fleet as it was
heading towards Pearl Harbor this use of force would not have been anticipatory.7 1
By the same token, if missiles are fired towards the United States, the United
States may respond before the missiles hit; this is not anticipatory action.
7 2
It is difficult not to think that in adopting such logic, restrictionists have taken
a long step toward becoming counter-restrictionists. The incoherence of the
restrictionist position is apparent when we ask: At what point has an armed attack
begun? Under the restrictionist reading of Article 51, the right of self-defense is
not activated until the exact instant an armed attack has begun.73  Some
commentators have sought to distinguish "armed attack" from "preparations for
armed attack., 7 4 Response to armed attack is self-defense (allowed under Article
51), while force initiated against preparations for armed attack is anticipatory self-
defense (prohibited by Article 51). But the line between actual attack and
preparations for attack is an artificial one and cannot be drawn in practice.75 How
do we isolate the instant at which preparations end and an armed attack begins?
76
68. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37, at 236; McDougal, supra note 33, at 601. Even
Professor Louis Henkin, a restrictionist, recognizes that it may be necessary to allow a "small and
special exception [to the "armed attack" requirement] for the special case of the surprise nuclear
attack." See HENKIN, supra note 51, at 144.
69. See John Foster Dulles, The Challenge of Our Time: Peace with Justice, 39 A.B.A J. 1063,
1066 (1953).
70. See DINSTEIN, supra note 33, at 178.
71. Professor Dinstein calls this a response to "incipient attack." See Dinstein, supra note 44, at
161; O'Connell, supra note 32, at 8-9, 12, quoting YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-
DEFENSE 172 (3d ed. 2001). Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell accepts Dinstein's conclusion so long as
the hostile intent of the Japanese fleet was clear. Id. at 9.
72. See HENKIN, supra note 51, at 142 ("In all probability, then, only an actual take-off by Soviet
planes or missiles would cause the United States to strike, and in that case the United States is not
'anticipating' an armed attack, for the attack would have begun."). Accord Dinstein, supra note 44, at
160-61.
73. See DINSTEIN, supra note 33, at 176.
74. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37, at 240.
75. Id.
76. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37, at 240; SCHACHTER, supra note 37, at 151 ("Just
when an armed attack may be said to begin cannot be determined by an a priori rule."). Some writers
have suggested irrevocability or irreversibility as the line of demarcation. When an attack can no longer
be recalled, then it has "occurred" within the meaning of Article 51 and response in self-defense is
permitted. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra, at 239-40, citing Nagendra Singh, The Right of Self-
Defense in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 5 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFF. 3 (1956). Accord
DINSTEIN, supra, at 179 ("[A]n armed attack may precede the firing of the first shot. The crucial
question is who embarks upon an irreversible course of action .... ). But, as Professors McDougal and
Feliciano point out, irrevocability is an unworkable criterion for determining when an armed attack
begins because a state which launches an intercontinental missile may abort the missile until almost up
the point of impact. See McDoUGAL AND FELICIANO, supra, at 240. Thus the proposed
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And why should we? If an armed attack "occurs" the instant a missile is launched
why not the instant before the firing button is pushed? Or the day before? Or a
week? Isn't this a formalistic requirement? 77 And could a state time its action
with this degree of exactitude? "Don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes"
is ill-adapted to the nuclear age.
VI. STATE PRACTICE AND ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
When states acquiesce to conduct new customary international law is
formed.78 Counter-restrictionists argue that state practice has been to acquiesce to
anticipatory self defense. 79 The leading examples are the 1962 U.S. blockade of
Cuba, Israel's pre-emptive attack on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967, the Israeli
bombing run on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981, and the 1986 U.S. air strikes
against terrorist camps in Libya.
s8
The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Kennedy Administration avoided justifying the Cuban "quarantine"
either in terms of the customary principle of anticipatory self defense or as an
application of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.8' The Administration's public
irrevocability/irreversibility test translates into a requirement that the defender must absorb the first
blow. (Professor Dinstein undercuts his own irreversibility argument two paragraphs earlier by
asserting that it does not matter if the missile can be aborted before impact. See DINSTEIN, supra note
33, at 179). Finally, irreversibility/irrevocability fails as a criterion because the target state may be in
no position to tell whether an attack can be aborted.
77. See Terrence Taylor, Iraq and the "Bush Doctrine" of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense, at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-taylor.html (August 20, 2002) (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
78. See Turner, supra note 17, at 165-66; Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and
International Law After 11 September, 51 INT'L L. & COMP. L. Q. 401, 409-10, 410 n.46 (2002). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 48, at §102 Comment b ("Inaction may constitute state
practice, as when a state acquiesces in acts of another state that affect its legal rights."). This is because
international law rests on state consent. What states consent to may change over time. State practice
provides evidence of what states consent to.
State practice may also be looked to for interpretation of a treaty; for instance, to determine what
meaning parties attach to terms such as "armed attack." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations art. 31(3)(b),
reprinted in 25 ILM 543 (1986). Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 48, §325(2).
79. See David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, & Darin R. Bartram, Remember the Caroline, NAT'L
REV. 17, 18 (July 1, 2002).
80. Id.; Thomas Franck, Iraq and the "Bush Doctrine" of Pre-emptive Self-Defense, available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-franck.htm (August 20, 2002) (visited September 8, 2002).
Consider also Tanzania's invasion of Uganda, the use of force by the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars, and Israel's raid on Entebbe,
Uganda. While not instances of anticipatory self-defense these actions are relevant to determining the
legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense. Tanzania, ECOWAS, and Israel did not seek prior approval
from the Security Council for the use of force. Yet none of these applications of force was censured by
the Security Council. See Rivkin, et al, supra note 79, at 18; Franck supra. This demonstrates that the
use of force without prior Security Council approval is not absolutely prohibited. Professor Thomas
Franck argues that the Security Council, in a "creative adaption" of the Charter, has come to perform a
"jurying function" whereby the Council evaluates the justice of pre-emptive attack on a case by case
basis. See Franck supra. I suggest that this practice may represent a partial return sub rosa of just war
theory.
81. See HENKIN, supra note 51, at 294; Abram Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba,
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statements, for example the President's national address of October 22, 1962,
spoke merely of "defense." 82 The Kennedy Administration's official legal basis
for the quarantine was regional peacekeeping under the OAS Charter.83 The
regional peacekeeping argument, however, fails because a regional organization
cannot do what none of its members would be allowed to do individually. 84 The
deficiencies of the regional peacekeeping argument have led scholars to justify the
Cuban "quarantine" on the basis of anticipatory self defense.85
Restrictionists maintain that the quarantine did not meet the strictures of
Article 51. There was no imminent threat of much less an actual, armed attack on
the United States.86  The United States was confronted with no more than a
potential threat.
However, there are good reasons for not applying Article 51 's "armed attack"
requirement literally. First is the advent of nuclear weapons.87  Second is the
failure of collective security and of the Security Council to maintain the peace. The
Charter strictures on the use of force must be relaxed because the Security Council
47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 763, 764 (Nov. 19, 1962). Chayes was Department of State Legal Adviser
during the crisis so this may be taken as an official statement.
82. See Radio and Television Report, supra note 28, at 807 ("in the defense of our own security
and of the entire Western Hemisphere"); Proclamation 3504: Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive
Weapons to Cuba (Oct. 23, 1962), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 809, 810 (1962) ("to defend
the security of the United States").
83. See Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National Security Council (Oct. 22, 1962), reprinted
in THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962: SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS FROM THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY, JANUARY 1961-NOVEMBER 1962 209, 209 (2001) ("Secretary
Rusk stated that the best legal basis for our blockade action was the Rio Treaty. The use of force would
be justified on the ground of support for the principles of the United Nations Charter, not on the basis of
Article 51, which might give the Russians a basis for attacking Turkey."); HENKIN, supra note 51, at
290; ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 5I, 121 (1969);
Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOR'N AFF. 550, 554 (1963); Chayes, supra note
81, at 764; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 Articles 6, 8, reprinted in 17 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 565 (Sept. 21, 1947) [hereinafter Rio Treaty]. The OAS resolution authorizing the
quarantine is reprinted at 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 722 (Nov. 12, 1962) and in KENNEDY, supra at 143.
The United Nations Charter allows regional security arrangements under Chapter VIII.
84. See Rostow, supra note 42, at 515. Collective self-defense is subject to the same Article 51
strictures as individual self-defense. Id. Moreover, Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, like Article 51 of the
UN Charter, requires an armed attack as the precondition for the unilateral use of force in self-defense.
Rio Treaty, supra note 83, at art. 3. Where a threat falls short of an armed attack, the OAS Organ of
Consultation may authorize the use of force. Id. at art. 5, 8. This raises a difficulty: whether the force
employed constitutes an "enforcement action" under U.N. Charter Article 53. See Quincy Wright, The
Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L. L. 546, 558-59 (1963). Enforcement actions cannot be undertaken
absent Security Council approval. U.N. CHARTER art. 53; see Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush Nor
the "Jurisprudes, " 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (July 2003), reprinted in FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ
CONFLICT 33, 35-36 (2003). The Organ of Consultation is the inter-American system's equivalent of
the United Nations Security Council.
85. See HENKIN, supra note 47, at 294.
86. See Rex J. Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 129, 131 (1987) (no imminent threat of attack);
Rostow, supra note 42, at 515.
87. See supra, § V.
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is no longer effective, if it ever was, in safeguarding the peace. 8 Faced with a
Security Council deadlocked by the veto, regional organizations like the OAS are a
good substitute for the Charter system of collective security. 89 The collective
decision-making engaged in by regional organizations, the forum they provide for
deliberation, and their built-in checks and balances are safeguards against the use
of force for aggression.
90
Furthermore, in a larger sense the imminence requirement was preserved,
although, in an expansion of the law, the meaning of imminence expanded to
include not just an imminent attack but an imminent shift in the balance of power
occasioned by a rogue state's imminent acquisition of the capacity to attack. 91
Soviet missiles ninety miles from Florida would have radically reduced U.S.
response time to a nuclear attack, heightening U.S. vulnerability.92  The world
acquiesced in this change in the law.93
The Six Day War
On June 5, 1967 Israeli air strikes hit air bases in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.94
The strikes were justified under theories of both reactive, and anticipatory, self-
defense: reactive self-defense against the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of
Tiran95 and anticipatory self-defense to forestall an imminent attack from Egyptian
and Syrian armies massing on Israel's frontier.96 Statements from the Arab nations
88. See Chayes, supra note 83, at 556. This argument is developed in depth in sec. VII infra.
89. Id.
90. See Chayes, supra note 81, at 765.
91. See Wedgwood, supra note 16, at 732.
92. Id. at 733; Myres S. McDougal, supra note 68, at 601.
93. See Rostow, supra note 42, at 515; Brunson MacChesney, Some Comments on the
"Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592, 596 (1963). State acquiescence to a change in the law
forms new customary law. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. A draft Soviet resolution
condemning the quarantine was vetoed in the Security Council. See 22 U.N. SCOR (135 1 ' mtg.) at 5,
U.N. Doc. S/7951. Rev. 1 (1967), cited in Beth M. Polebaum, Note, National Self-Defense in
International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187, 205, 205 n.114
(1984). An additional argument for the legality of the Cuban Quarantine, that the quarantine fell
outside UN Charter Article 2(4)'s general prohibition on the use of force, is considered infra at text
accompanying notes 143 - 45.
94. See MARTIN GILBERT, A HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, VOLUME THREE: 1952-1999
366 (1999). For a brief account of the Six-Day War, see GILBERT, supra, at 365-68; Amos Shapira,
The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 205, 205-08 (John
Norton Moore, ed. 1975); Charles W. Yost, The Arab-Israeli War: How It Began, 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
304 (1967/68).
95. On May 22, 1967 Egypt announced that it would blockade the Straits of Tiran in the Gulf of
Aqaba against Israeli ships. GILBERT, supra note 94, at 365; Shapira, supra note 91, at 207; Yost,
supra note 94, at 315. Israel contended that the Egyptian blockade constituted an act of war against
which it was entitled to act in self-defense. See MICHAEL B. OREN, Six DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 100 (2002); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 112-13 (2000); Michael Byers, Terror and the Future of International Law, in
WORLDS IN COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER 118, 124 (Ken Booth & Tim
Dunne, eds. 2002); Yost, supra note 94, at 316 (citing May 23, 1967 statement of Israeli Prime Minister
Levi Eshkol).
96. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 233 (1986) ("all
indications supported the imminence of this attack"). Accord Wall, supra note 59, at 100; Polebaum,
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convinced Israel that it was in imminent danger.97 The most ominous was the May
26, 1967 statement of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser that: "Our basic
objective will be to destroy Israel."9
Why did Israel act without Security Council authorization? One explanation
is the failure of the Security Council in the crisis. 99 The Security Council's initial
failure was its inability to halt El Fatah terrorist raids on Israel conducted from
Syria. The raids led to escalating tension between Israel and the surrounding Arab
states and finally war.'00 The danger to Israel was exacerbated by U.N. Secretary
General U Thant's withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
from Sinai.' The withdrawal of UNEF removed the buffer between Egypt and
Israel and left Israel exposed.10 2 The earlier Soviet veto of the resolution against
Syria demonstrated that Israel could not expect a U.N. enforcement action in her
defense. The United Nations had made clear that Israel was on her own.
The legality of Israel's preemptive use of force was further bolstered by U.N.
acquiescence to Israel's preemptive attack. 10 3 Following the end of the war the
Soviet Union introduced no fewer than three resolutions in the Security Council
condemning Israel. All were rejected. 1°4 While the Security Council fell short of
endorsing the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, significantly, there was no
supra note 93, at 192-94.
97. See Dinstein, supra note 44, at 161.
98. See GILBERT, supra note 94, at 366.
99. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 233 (1986); Ruth
Lapidoth, The Security Council in the May 1967 Crisis: A Study in Frustration, 4 ISRAEL L. REV. 534,
545-50 (1969). The argument that the Charter restrictions on the use of force were premised upon
Security Council effectiveness is discussed infra at sec. VII.
A not inconsiderable factor in Israel's decision to preempt was the fact that four-fifths of Israel's army
was composed of civilians. See RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL & WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE Six DAY
WAR 53 (1967). With the bulk of Israel's population mobilized to defend the nation by the end of May
Israeli farms and factories were virtually at a standstill. The Arab nations, with their far greater
populations, could afford to outwait the Israelis. Israel faced a choice between attacking first and
economic collapse. Id.
100. See Yost, supra note 94, at 304-05 (on the El Fatah raids). See Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc.
S/7575/Rev. 1 (3 Nov. 1966); Lapidoth, supra note 99, at 549 (A proposed Security Council resolution
calling on Syria to restrain El Fatah was introduced by Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, and Uganda on November 3, 1966. It was vetoed by the Soviet Union the following day.).
101. See 1967 U.N.Y.B. 177. The 1956 Suez Crisis ended with Israeli occupation of the Sinai
Peninsula, Egyptian territory. See GILBERT, supra note 94, at 365 (Israel's withdrawal from Sinai was
brokered by the United Nations in exchange for the placement in Sinai with Egyptian consent of a
peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The UNEF was created by UN
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjdld pursuant to resolutions of the UN General Assembly.); G.A. Res.
998, U.N. GAOR, I 1h Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3299 (1956); G.A. Res. 1000, U.N. GAOR, I 1th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/3301 (1956); FREDERICK H. FLEITZ, JR., PEACEKEEPING FIASCOES OF THE 1990S: CAUSES,
SOLUTIONS, AND U.S. INTERESTS 37-47 (2002).
102. See Lapidoth, supra note 96, at 536 n.9 (1969) (Egypt requested UNEF to withdraw on May
16, 1967); Yost, supra note 91, at 311, 313 (UNEF withdrew on May 18).
103. See Schwebel, supra note 43, at 481; Dinstein, supra note 44, at 162.
104. See Draft Soviet Security Council Resolutions S/7951, S/7951/Rev. 1, S/7951/Rev. 2. All
three resolutions were rejected on June 14, 1967. See Shapira, supra note 94, at 219, 219 n. 32;
Polebaum, supra note 93, at 193 n.38.
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consensus in the Security Council against it.'05 Professor Louis Ren6 Beres
concludes that the Security Council's failure to condemn Israel constituted
"implicit approval" of Israel's preemptive strike.1
0 6
The Soviet bloc fared no better in the General Assembly where another four
resolutions condemning Israel were rejected.10 7 Inasmuch as there is no veto in the
General Assembly the General Assembly's refusal to condemn Israel is an even
more reliable gauge of world approval of Israel's preemptive strike.
Osiraq
Paradoxically, although it was unanimously condemned in the Security
Council,10 8 Israel's June 7, 1981 air attack on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor
provides support for the right of anticipatory self defense.'0 9  Consider the
following:
(1) Security Council condemnation of the Israeli raid must be discounted
because no sanctions were imposed on Israel."10 Political considerations may
require that the international community condemn what it secretly approves.",
Security Council condemnation of the raid should not be accepted at face value
because no sanctions were attached" 12 Failure to attach sanctions amounted to
state acquiescence in Israel's conduct! 13
(2) Condemnation of the raid does not indicate a rejection of the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense but at most a finding that the requirements for
anticipatory self-defense were not met in this particular case. Less than half of the
delegations condemned anticipatory self-defense outright' 1 4 Statements by other
delegates held out the possibility that they might have approved preemption under
different circumstances.' 5 These delegates applied Caroline but thought that
105. See Arend, supra note 39, at 95. This would hold true with regard to the Security Council's
response to Israel's June 7, 1981 raid on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor. See infra note 116 and
accompanying text.
106. See Beres, supra note 67, at 93. Accord JULIUS STONE, THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER CEASE-
FIRE 6, 10 (1967), cited in Shapira, supra note 94, at 219-20, 220 n.33.
107. See Draft Soviet General Assembly Resolution A/L519 and Draft Albanian General Assembly
Resolutions A/L521, A/L524, and A/L525. All four of these resolutions were rejected on July 4, 1967.
See Shapira, supra note 94, at 219, 219 n.32.
108. See S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/487 (19 June 1981).
109. See Rivkin, Casey, and Bartram, supra note 79, at 18; and Louis Ren6 Beres & Col. Yoash
Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMPLE INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 437 (1995). For background on the Israeli strike see RODGER W. CLAIRE, RAID ON THE
SUN: INSIDE ISRAEL'S SECRET CAMPAIGN THAT DENIED SADDAM THE BOMB (2004).
110. See Rivkin, Casey, and Bartram, supra note 79, at 18; Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike
upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584, 586 (1983); Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra
note 109, at 447, 439-40; Beres, supra note 67, at 93.
111. Id. at 586.
112. See D'Amato, supra note 110, at 586.
113. Id.
114. See U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (12 June 1981) (Algeria);
U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2286th mtg. at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2286 (17 June 1981) (Somalia); U.N.
SCOR 36th Sess., 2287th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2287 (17 June 1981) (Nicaragua).
115. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 58-60, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 (1981) (United
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Israel had failed to meet the Caroline criteria.' 1
6
Some delegates accused Israel of having failed to demonstrate that Iraq had an
intent to produce bombs arguing that capacity to build bombs is not the same thing
as intent to build." 7 Astonishingly, the Council brushed aside the inescapable
conclusion that Iraqi animosity was implied by Iraq's record of hostile acts toward
Israel. "'18
And although some delegates scolded Israel for not approaching the Security
Council before using force, 119 conveniently passed over was the Security Council's
earlier failure before and during the 1967 war to ensure Israel's security. The law
does not require a futile gesture and Israel had good reason to believe the Security
Council would not block future aggression towards Israel.
There was no consensus in the Security Council as to the legitimacy of
anticipatory self-defense. 120 Osiraq leaves the door open to a conclusion that
anticipatory self-defense may be legal under some circumstances. The Security
Council's condemnation of the raid seems not to indicate a rejection of the right of
anticipatory self-defense but merely a conclusion that the requirements for
anticipatory self-defense were not met in this case. With the benefit of hindsight
the Security Council very probably would reach a different conclusion.' 21 Iraq's
post-Osiraq conduct-its instigation of the Iran-Iraq war and invasion of Kuwait,
its violation of numerous Security Council resolutions, 122 and its use of poison gas
against the Iraqi Kurds-have forced a reevaluation of the 1981 raid. Could
Saddam have been ousted from Kuwait if Israel had not prevented Saddam from
developing nuclear weapons?
123
States) ("[O]ur judgment that Israeli actions violated the United Nations Charter is based solely on the
conviction that Israel failed to exhaust peaceful means for the resolution of this dispute.") (emphasis
added).
116. Other than the delegate from Israel, only the delegate from Uganda referred to Caroline by
name and expressly identified the factors invoked as derived from the Caroline doctrine. U.N. SCOR
36th Sess., 2282nd mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2282 (1981). Sierra Leone's delegate quotes Webster's
formula without identifying it as the Caroline doctrine. U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2283rd mtg. at 57, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2283 (1981).
117. U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2281st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2281 (1981) (League of Arab
States).
118. A better test for intent has been formulated by Professor Ruth Wedgwood. See infra note 190.
119. U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doe. SIPV.2288 (19 June 1981) (Mexico);
U.N. SCOR 36th Sess., 2284th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2284 (16 June 1981) (Philippines); U.N.
SCOR 36th Sess., 2283rd mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2283 (15 June 1981) (Sierra Leone).
120. See AREND & BECK, supra note 36, at 79 (lesson of Osiraq is that there is no international
consensus for or against anticipatory self-defense).
121. See CLAIRE, supra note 109, at 240 (quoting Cheney); Wall, supra note 59, at 100 (quoting
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell approving Osiraq raid); George F. Will, The F-16 Solution, WASH.
POST., Nov. 1, 2001, at A35 (quoting opinion of Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense during Operation
Desert Storm, that the Israeli raid on the Osiraq reactor made the coalition's task easier); W. Michael
Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 3, 18 (1999) (consensus
of scholars approves of Osiraq raid); Louis Ren6 Beres, After the Scud Attack: Israel "Palestine, " and
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 75, 99 (1992).
122. See supra note 20.
123. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, A LONG SHORT WAR: THE POSTPONED LIBERATION OF IRAQ 54
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1986 U.S. Air Strikes on Libya
On April 14, 1986, the United States bombed targets in Libya. 24 The raid
was in response to a bomb explosion on April 5, 1986 in a West Berlin discotesque
which killed one American serviceman and wounded other persons.125 The United
States placed responsibility for the bombing on Libyan terrorists.126
In a national television address following the raid, President Ronald Reagan
justified the attack as self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. 27  While the impetus for the raid was the West Berlin bombing, the
Libyan air strikes were a forward looking-thus, preemptive-measure'
28
designed, in the President's words, to "diminish Colonel Qadhafi's capacity to
export terror."'' 29  The President characterized the U.S. attack as a "preemptive
action"' 30 and stated that the purpose of the raid was "to deter acts of terrorism by
Libya."'
13 1
Even if the raid failed to meet the strictures of either Article 51 or custom, the
Security Council, notably, failed to condemn the attack. 32  While international
opinion at the time was critical of the 1986 Libya raid, 133 a scant seven years later
the very similar 1993 U.S. air strike on Iraq attracted generally favorable world
reaction.' 34  This may signal a shift internationally from a restrictionist to a
counter-restrictionist reading of Article 51 in the years following the 1986 Libya
(2003); Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 110, at 439. A further argument for the legality of the
Osiraq raid, that the raid fell outside U.N. Charter Article 2(4)'s general prohibition on the use of force,
is discussed infra at nn. 139-145.
124. President's Address to the Nation, United States Air Strike Against Libya, 1986 PUB. PAPERS
491 (April 14, 1986) [hereinafter Reagan Address]. President Ronald Reagan described the targets as
"headquarters, terrorist facilities and military installations that support Libyan subversive activities."
Letter from President Reagan to Congress, 1986 PUB. PAPERS 499 (April 16, 1986) [hereinafter Reagan
Letter].
125. Reagan Address, supra note 124.
126. Id.
127. Id. The President said: "Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose
behind the mission undertaken tonight, a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter." The raid was also described as self-defense under Article 51 in President Reagan's letter to
Congress. See Reagan Letter, supra note 124.
128. See Glennon, Preempting Terrorism, supra note 58, at 25.
129. Reagan Address, supra note 124.
130. Id.; Reagan Letter, supra note 124.
13 1. Id. (emphasis added). According to President Reagan, the United States action would
"provide [Qadahafi] with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior." See Reagan Address,
supra note 124.
132. Draft S.C. Res. Condemning 1986 Libya Strike, UN Doc. S/10784. The resolution won the
nine votes needed to pass but was vetoed by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.
Australia and Denmark also voted against the resolution. U.N. SCOR 41st Sess., 2682nd mtg. at 43,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (Apr. 21, 1986), 40 U.N. Y.B. 254 (1986). A resolution condemning the attack
did pass in the United Nations General Assembly. See G.A. Res. 41/38 (XII) (20 Nov. 1986), 40 U.N.
Y.B. 257-58 (1986). The General Assembly resolution passed 79-28-33. 40 U.N. Y.B. at 258.
133. See Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986 Bombing of
Libya: The New Interpretation ofArticle 51, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 105-06 (1994).
134. Id. at 103; Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as "Armed Attack".- The Right to Self-Defense,
Article 51 ('2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27:2 FLETCHER FORUM 35, 36 (2003).
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air strikes and a more accommodating international attitude toward the unilateral
use of force.
3 5
VII. THE FAILURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT
Longing to wed with Peace, what did we do?-
Sketched her a fortress on a paper pad
-Edna St. Vincent Millay
136
Has the Security Council failed? Abram Chayes has observed that "[e]vents
since 1945 have demonstrated that the Security [Council]... was not a wholly
viable institution. The veto has largely disabled it from fulfilling its intended role
in keeping the peace."'13 7  The 291 interstate conflicts fought since the United
Nations' founding attest to the Council's ineffectiveness.'
38
The Charter rules prohibiting force, chiefly Articles 2(4) and 51, were
premised upon an effective Security Council. 13 9 In a world in which the Security
Council fulfilled its role of preserving peace there would be no need for
anticipatory self-defense. But if the Security Council cannot-or will not-
maintain peace, it is senseless to demand that states strictly adhere to Articles 2(4)
and 51.140 The burden of self-defense thus falls largely on each individual state
135. See Baker, supra note 133, at 110-13.
136. EDNA ST. VINCENT MILLAY, MAKE BRIGHT THE ARROWS: 1940 NOTEBOOK 57 (1940).
137. See Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOR'N AFF. 550, 556 (1963). See
also McDougal, supra note 33, at 599 (assessing the "continuing ineffectiveness of the general
community organization to act quickly and certainly for the protection of states"). For the veto held by
the Security Council's five Permanent Members-the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China,
and France-see U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para 3.
138. See Glennon, supra note 42, at 540. See also Franck, supra note 61, at 51 (referring to
Charter's "fundamental promise to provide an effective system of collective measures to protect states
against violators of the peace. This promise, unfortunately, has not been kept.").
139. See JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS
THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 96-98 (1958). The Charter itself arguably recognizes that the Security
Council may prove ineffective and provides for that contingency. Article 51 specifies that a state may
act in self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51. This implies that if the Security Council adopts measures
which do not maintain international peace and security then the defending state remains seized of the
matter. See I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, ed.,
9th ed. 1992); Rostow, supra note 42, at 511; Fawcett, supra note 58, at 361-62; Waldock, supra note
44, at 498 ("inadequate" United Nations action).
140. Professor Louis Ren6 Beres notes: "The argument against the restrictive view of self defense
is reinforced by the apparent inability of the Security Council to provide collective security against an
aggressor." See Beres, supra note 67, at 93. Accord Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 43, at 543-44 (Jennings,
dissenting); WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (1964)
("[l]n the absence of effective international machinery the fight of self-defense must probably now be
extended to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently contrary language
of Article 51 of the Charter."). Recall that fundamentally changed circumstances permit deviation from
the terms of a treaty, including the United Nations Charter. See Kirgis, supra note 65.
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with anticipatory self-defense as an indispensable tool for national survival.141
Anticipatory self-defense should not be seen as incompatible with the
purposes of the United Nations Charter. U.N. Charter Article 2(4) is not a blanket
prohibition on all unilateral use of force but only a prohibition on force which
impairs another state's "territorial integrity or political independence" or which is
"in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'
' 42
Since the purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain international peace and
security,"' 143 preemption is legal under Article 2(4) if it advances these goals. 44 A
careful reading reveals that preemption is built into the Charter. Professor Robert
F. Turner points out that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to prevent
threats before they mature.' 45 By acting in the Security Council's stead the United
States and its coalition partners were merely fulfilling a responsibility the Security
Council had abdicated. President Bush has stressed that a major purpose of
Operation Iraqi Freedom was to enforce Security Council resolutions mandating
Iraqi disarmament. 46 The Security Council could not bring itself to take action,
instead preferring to give Saddam an unending string of toothless warnings to
disarm.
147
Far from being unlawful per se, preemption may be "law-enforcing."'
148
141. See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 319 (1989) ("In a world arena in which authoritative and effective
power remains largely unorganized and decentralized, various lesser communities can hardly be
expected to achieve even minimum security... if they are denied appropriate capabilities and measures
of response.").
142. See STONE, supra note 139, at 95; D'Amato, supra note 110, at 584-86. Article 2(4) provides:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
143. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
144. Thus, according to Professors McDougal and Feliciano: "[P]ermitting defense against an
imminently expected attack does not, any more than permitting defense against an actual current attack,
impair or dilute the 'authority and responsibility' of the organized community 'to maintain or restore
international peace and security." See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37, at 237. As Professor
McDougal writes elsewhere: "[Tlhe customary right of defense, as limited by the requirements of
necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be regarded as inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." McDougal, supra note 33, at 600.
145. See Turner, supra note 17, at 168; U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. I (purpose of United Nations is
"prevention and removal of threats to the peace) (emphasis added).
146. See Bush's Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2003, at A14 (col. 1); UN SPEECH, supra note 7. The Joint Congressional Resolution of October
16, 2002 lists enforcement of UN resolutions and U.S. self-defense as the rationale for the authorization
for the use of military force against Iraq. See Iraq Resolution, supra note 9, § 3(a).
147. See supra note 18. Compare the Security Council's comparable success in coping with the
threat posed by the Taliban. From 1998 through mid-2001 the Council repeatedly demanded that the
Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden and cease its support for international terrorism. See Wall, supra
note 59, at 101-02, 106 n.36. The result we know.
148. See Beres, After the Gulf War, supra note 11, at 266; Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 109,
at 440. Beres and Chatto write: "In the absence of a centralized enforcement body, international law
relies upon the willingness of individual states to act on behalf of the entire global community." Id. at
439. Individual law enforcement action is consistent with Article 24(1) of the Charter which gives the
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Thus, Israel's 1967 preemptive strikes against Egypt and Syria, and her 1981 strike
on the Osiraq nuclear reactor were in harmony with the purposes of the United
Nations. The strikes protected a member state from aggression. By the same
token the Cuban quarantine was not "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations" because it defused Soviet aggression. 49 It was Cuba and the Soviet
Union, not the United States, who violated Article 2(4) by the threat of force
implicit in their attempt to install Soviet missiles in the Western Hemisphere.1 50
Some writers go further and assert not merely that the Charter rules have been
relaxed but that the Charter rules prohibiting the use of force are dead.1 51 Under
the principle of desuetude, a treaty provision, such as Articles 2(4) and 51 of the
U.N. Charter may lose its force through long-term disuse or nonobservance.152 We
have already cited Michael Glennon's reference to the 291 interstate conflicts
fought since the United Nations' founding.' 53 Glennon also refers to the concept
of non liquet. A non liquet ("it is not clear") occurs when the legal norms in an
area of the law are so internally contradictory or confused that we cannot articulate
the law. 154 Under the rule in The S.S. Lotus states may do as they please unless a
restriction has been established by treaty or customary law. 55 Glennon concludes
that since the Charter no longer works to maintain peace there is currently no law
which restricts how states may use force. The U.S. attack on Iraq was legal
because: "[T]here was no international law forbidding it. It was therefore
impossible to act unlawfully.'
156
To be worthy of the name, a system of law must be capable of disciplining
nonconforming elements. And when a legal system consists largely of
nonconforming elements, we ought to suspect that "system" is dead. Law is a
system of norms which describes, predicts, and controls the conduct of actors in
the system. But the Charter rules on force do not describe how states behave. The
Security Council "primary" not exclusive responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security. See Turner, supra note 17, at 179, 184; U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
149. See Eustace Seligman, The Legality of the U.S. Quarantine Action under the United Nations
Charter, 49 A.B.A. J. 142, 142 (1963).
150. The Charter prohibits not only force but threats of force. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
151. For commentators taking this view, see, e.g., Arend, supra note 40; Glennon, supra note 42;
Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defense in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION
OF THE USE OF FORCE (A. Cassese ed., 1986); Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 809 (1970).
152. See Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOR'N AFF. 16, 22 (2003);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 48, § 102 reporter's note 4.
153. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. As Professor Glennon observes: "So many states
have used force with such regularity in so wide a variety of situations that it can no longer be said that
any customary norm of state practice constrains the use of force." See Glennon, supra note 151, at 554.
For a brief catalog of uses of force conducted without Security Council authorization, see Arend, supra
note 151, at 100.
154. See Glennon, supra note 151, at 555 n.49 ("non liquet refers to an insufficiency in the law, to
the conclusion that the law does not permit deciding a case one way or the other").
155. See Glennon, supra note 152, at 23. This is the holding of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in The S.S. Lotus, (1927) P.C.I.J. Reports, Set. A, No. 9, at 18.




rules neither constrain nor punish violators. And the rules do not predict how
states will act (to the contrary, the best prediction is that states will ignore the rules
whenever expedient). Instead, the Charter prohibitions on the unilateral use of
force are "paper rules": they have no real force.157
Restrictionists, naturally, dispute that the Charter prohibitions on force are
dead. Restrictionists cite dictum from the International Court of Justice to the
effect that when states depart from the Charter rules these departures are not state
practice supporting new legal norms-they are violations of international law.
158
These departures are not state practice supporting the emergence of new norms
because opiniojuris is lacking. 159 Restrictionists find support in the fact that states
do not publicly repudiate the Charter rules. 160 But as Michael Glennon points out,
states do not openly repudiate the rules because states avoid "needless
confrontation."' 161 What is more, to require express repudiation is to presuppose
the existence of a rule under which an international norm ceases to be binding only
once it is openly repudiated. 162  But such a "rule" finds no support in state
practice. 163
VIII. MUST AN ATTACK BE IMMINENT?
157. Id. at 31.
158. See Nicaragua case, at para. 186 ("instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule
should generally be treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule"),
quoted in O'Connell, supra note 32, at 14.
159. Opinio juris sive necessitatis is the subjective component of customary international law.
Opinio juris is defined as states' conviction that they engage in, or refrain from, particular conduct
because doing so is legally required rather than a matter of convenience. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 48, § 102 cmt. c (1987). New customary law requires both state practice and supporting opinio
juris. Id. § 102(2).
160. See O'Connell, supra note 32, at 15. Thus, Professor O'Connell points out that the Bush
Administration has not publicly repudiated the Charter rules. Id. at 15. Professor O'Connell maintains
that in the past the United States has consistently opposed preemption. Id. at 12-13, 15-17 (e.g.,
Eisenhower Administration opposed preemption by Britain, France, and Israel during the 1956 Suez
Crisis).
161. See Glennon, supra note 152, at 24.
162. Id. at 23-24.
163. Id. at 24. Some critics argue that the Bush Administration has repudiated the Charter rules.
At a news conference on the eve of the Iraq war President Bush was asked whether an invasion without
Security Council authorization would violate the United Nations Charter. President Bush answered:
"[Wlhen it comes to our security if we need to act we will act. And we really don't need the United
Nations' approval to do so.... [W]hen it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's
permission." See Excerpts from Bush 's News Conference on Iraq and Likelihood of War, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar, 7, 2003, Al, at 12. One commentator concluded that "It's hard to see this remark as anything
other than a repudiation of the framework of international law governing the use of force, as set out in
the United Nations Charter." See Anthony Dworkin, Would War Be Lawful Without Another U.N.
Resolution?, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-iraq2.html (Mar. 10, 2003) (visited Mar. 15,
2004) (emphasis added). Professor Thomas M. Franck also maintains that the United States has
repudiated the Charter restrictions on the use of force. See Thomas M. Francek, What Happens Now?
The United Nations after Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 617 (2003), reprinted in FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 55, 65 (2003). On the other hand, the President's comment may merely reflect
the belief that Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified under Article 51 of the Charter, in which case
Security Council "permission" to use force would not be needed.
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The foregoing demonstrates that an actual armed attack is not a precondition
for the exercise of self-defense. According to most scholars, the customary right
of self-defense-which subsumes anticipatory self-defense-requires only that an
attack be imminent.'64 Does the requirement of an imminent attack present an
insuperable objection to the legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom? The Bush
Administration never suggested that Iraq was about to attack in a week or a month.
Even former CIA analyst Kenneth M. Pollack, a leading advocate of invasion,
admitted prior to the invasion that Saddam was not an imminent threat.1 65 Instead
of characterizing Iraq as an imminent threat, the White House argued that the
United States needed to act at once because waiting would only allow Iraq to
become stronger.
66
Some commentators believe that the Bush Administration is seeking to
expand the law. 167 Privately, some Administration supporters have admitted that
they seek an extension of the law. 168 The National Security Strategy argues for the
need to "adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries." 169 The President's 2003 State of the Union address seemed
to suggest abandonment rather than adaptation of the customary requirement of an
imminent attack. 70
If the Administration is seeking to expand the law, there is good reason for so
doing. Nuclear weapons and other WMD call into question the customary
requirement of an imminent attack just as forcefully as they call into question the
164. See Zedalis, supra note 86, at 129. Under Caroline, anticipatory force in self-defense may be
used where there is "no moment for deliberation." See supra note 31.
165. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 148 ("Saddam is ... probably several years away from being an
irremediable danger.")
166. The President said: "If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today, and we do,
does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops
even more dangerous weapons?" Cincinnati Speech, supra note 1. The President added: "Some have
argued we should wait, and that's an option. In my view it's the riskiest of all options because the
longer we wait, the stronger and bolder Saddam Hussein will become." Id. The same argument was
made by Vice President Cheney in his Nashville speech. The Vice President assailed opponents of
immediate action against Iraq as taking the position that "We just need to let [Saddam] get stronger
before we do anything about it." See Nashville Speech, supra note 5.
167. See Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal
Change, ll J. POL. PHIL. 171, 179-83 (2003); Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and
International Law after 11 September, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 410 (2002).
168. See William Galston, Perils of Preemptive War, THE AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 27, 2002, at 24.
169. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 15 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the
NSS speaks of the need to pre-empt "emerging threats before they are fully formed," phraseology
which suggests action before threats become imminent. Id., in President Bush's Introduction.
170. The President said: "Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when
have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?"
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ sou). A year earlier the President had made clear that he was not suggesting
Iraq posed an imminent threat. In his 2002 State of the Union address President Bush described the Iraq
threat not as imminent, but as a "grave and growing danger." See President's 2002 State of the Union
Address, supra note 3. Later that year, before the United Nations General Assembly, the President
called Iraq "a grave and gathering danger." See UN SPEECH, supra note 7.
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Charter requirement of an "armed attack." '' States confront a radically different
environment than existed before Hiroshima. The National Security Strategy
observes that in the past an imminent threat was "most often [signaled by] a visible
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack."'172 These
conventional threats took time to develop. Today, a terrorist state which acquires
WMD can go practically overnight from posing no threat to posing an imminent
threat. Indeed we can never know when an attack is imminent. 17  U.S.
intelligence has had a mixed record in detecting emerging nuclear arsenals. 174 The
greatest danger is that we will not know that an attack is imminent until it is too
late. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and others have asked:
When was 9/11 imminent? 175
In reality, the Administration has been knocking at a door that is already
open. We have observed that state practice is to acquiesce in acts of preemption
well in advance of an imminent threat of attack. 176 In the Cuban Missile Crisis
imminence was recast from imminent attack to an imminent change in the balance
of power. '77
Furthermore, the restrictive rule set out in Caroline is inapplicable in the
context of Iraq.178 Caroline set out a highly restrictive standard for the anticipatory
use of force. Under the circumstances, this restrictive view made sense.
17 9
Caroline involved two friendly countries: the United States and Great Britain. The
United States, the target of Great Britain's preemptive attack, was not responsible
for the incursions into Canada; in fact, the United States was willing and able to
171. See Condoleezza Rice, The President's National Security Strategy, in THE NEOCON
READER 79, 82 (Irwin Stelzer, ed., 2004) ("new technology requires new thinking about when a threat
becomes 'imminent').
172. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 15.
173. See DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON TERROR
34 (2003) (need to balance the danger of striking too soon with waiting too long); Louis Ren6 Beres,
Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense under International Law, 26
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111, 124 (1993) (difficulty of distinguishing imminent from more remote
threats).
174. See Henry Sokolski, The Wrong Culprit, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 16, 2004, at 19.
175. See The Imminence Invention, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2003, at A8; Franqois Heisbourg, A Work
in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences, 26 WASH. Q. 75-76, 87, n.2 (2003) (quoting
remarks of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz); Bill Keller, The Sunshine Warrior, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 22, 2002, 48, 50. As Professor Ruth Wedgwood urges: "In a world of nuclear
danger, we may wish to permit anticipatory self-defense against overwhelming threats to national
safety, even where the threat is not immediate." See Wedgwood, supra note 59, at 619 n.40.
176. See supra sec. VI. Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol write that "the legal basis for
preemption has become so broad that it permits acts of anticipatory self-defense well before an attack
becomes imminent." See LAWRENCE F. KAPLAN & WILLIAM KRISTOL, THE WAR OVER IRAQ:
SADDAM'S TYRANNY AND AMERICA'S MISSION 85-86 (2003). See also Wall, supra note 59, at 99
(state practice departs from Caroline criteria); Abraham Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14
EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 214 (2003), available at http://ejil.org/joumal/Voll4/No2/artl.pdf (last visited
Jan. 10, 2003).
177. See Zedalis, supra note 86, at 131.
178. See Sofaer, supra note 176, at 214.
179. Id.
2004
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
restrain the Americans who were aiding the Canadian rebels. 180 Given these facts,
Great Britain would have needed to employ anticipatory force only in
extraordinary circumstances: only, as Secretary Webster wrote, where there existed
"[a] necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation."' 8'1 The situations in which preemptive
self-defense has been used in the modem era are entirely different from the facts in
Caroline. Cuba and the Soviet Union in 1962, the Arab states in 1967, Iraq in
1981, Libya in 1986, and Iraq again in 2003-all these cases involved rogue states.
Rogue states have no desire to restrain their aggression against the West or to
restrain terrorist groups taking refuge within their borders.
82
To cope with the danger presented by rogue states a more flexible standard is
required than the one set out in Caroline.'8 3 The standard remains that of necessity
and proportionality but necessity must be analyzed in terms of the totality of the
circumstances, that is to say, reasonableness. 184 Reasonableness in any particular
case may or may not include a temporally proximate threat of attack.
Professor McDougal assessed the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the Cuban Missile Crisis and concluded that the U.S. quarantine was necessary,
hence legal. 185 Judge Sofaer suggests that the factors relevant to determining the
necessity for exercising preemptive self-defense are: (1) the nature and magnitude
of the threat;' 8 6 (2) the likelihood of the threat being realized; 187 (3) exhaustion of
alternatives;18 8  and (4) whether under the circumstances preemption would be
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations Charter. 8 9 He concludes that
Operation Iraqi Freedom passes muster under this test. Saddam's track record of
aggression both against his neighbors and his own people as well as his personal
psychopathology made it highly likely that Saddam would commit aggression
again. 190 For ten years following the Persian Gulf ceasefire Saddam consistently
180. Id. at 214,219,220.
181. THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, supra note 31.
182. Judge Sofaer explains the limited scope of the Caroline doctrine: "[Webster's] exacting
standard is valid, if anywhere, only where the action considered is to be undertaken in the territory of a
state that is not responsible for the threat involved, and that is both able and willing to suppress it."
Abraham D. Sofaer, Iraq and International Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at AI0.
183. Sofaer, supra note 176, at 214, 220. Professor McDougal observes that "a test formulated in
the previous century for a controversy between two friendly states is hardly relevant to contemporary
controversies." See MeDougal, supra note 33, at 598.
184. Sofaer, supra note 176, at 212; McDougal, supra note 33, at 597. Reasonableness is the
standard accepted by the United States government. See Sofaer, supra, at 213 n. 18 and accompanying
text.
185. See McDougal, supra note 33, at 601-03.




190. Id. at 222-23. Compare Professor Ruth Wedgwood's test for hostile intent which similarly
takes into account the subject's past aggression. Professor Wedgwood suggests that intent may be
implied given: (1) a dictator or human rights violator; (2) who has a history of aggression; and (3)
who is attempting to aquire or develop WMD. See Attacking Iraq: Is Preemptive Self-Defense Lawful?,
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BRIEFING SERIES (Oct. 29, 2002) (available at
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violated Security Council resolutions demanding that he disarm.' 9' Operation Iraqi
Freedom was consistent with the purposes of the United Nations because it
enforced Security Council resolutions and eliminated a major threat to
international peace and security.92
IX. CONCLUSION
The Bush Administration has offered two arguments for the legality of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, the Administration has argued that Iraq's material
breach of Security Council Resolution 687, the Gulf War ceasefire, reactivates the
authorization of force made in Security Council Resolution 678.
However, the argument which has received the most public attention is that
Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified as preemptive self-defense. Pre-Charter
customary law allowed preemption given satisfaction of the requirements of
necessity and proportionality. Necessity signified an imminent attack and the
unavailability of alternative, peaceful means to forestall the attack. Whether the
customary right of anticipatory self-defense survives under the Charter is a matter
of controversy. On its face the Charter presents a blanket prohibition on the use of
force with only two exceptions: force authorized by the Security Council and,
under Article 51, self-defense if an armed attack occurs.
Counter-restrictionists present four main arguments against literal application
of Article 5 1's "armed attack" requirement: (1) the wording and drafting history
of Article 51 indicate that the Charter drafters did not intend to cut down the
customary right of anticipatory self-defense; (2) literal application of Article 51 's
"armed attack" requirement would require states to absorb the first blow in an
attack; (3) state practice has acquiesced in acts of anticipatory self defense; and (4)
the Charter prohibitions on the use of force were premised upon an effective
Security Council but the Security Council has proven ineffective in maintaining
international peace. These considerations necessitate the conclusion that self
defense must, perforce, fall to individual states and coalitions of the willing.
While it is apparent that an actual armed attack is no longer required for
permissible self-defense, what of the customary law requirement that self-defense
is allowed only where an attack is imminent? As no one in the Bush
Administration claimed that an Iraqi attack was imminent it might seem that
Operation Iraqi Freedom preempted a merely potential, not imminent, threat.
However, state practice supports a broad reading of what constitutes an imminent
attack. Moreover, the Caroline doctrine, which established the imminence
requirement, dealt with friendly states. A more flexible standard for self-defense is
needed in today's struggles with terrorist groups and with rogue regimes. Finally,
it may be that the Bush Administration is seeking to extend the law. If other
nations acquiesce in the coalition's invasion of Iraq, new law will be formed which
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/mediastream/debl.ram - recorded debate at the John Hopkins University School
of Advanced International Studies) (visited Mar. 22, 2003).
191. See Sofaer, supra note 176, at 223.
192. Id. at 223-24; Michla Pomerance, The Legality of the Iraq War, at
http://www.aijac.org.au/review/2003/284/Aegal-iraq.html (Apr. 2003) (visited Feb. 18, 2004).
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allows pre-emptive attack under circumstances akin to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
